Moral thinking caused by group selection
Dr Bowles, however, thinks that the virtues of human collaboration are so great that groups composed of genuine, self-sacrificing altruists would outcompete others.
https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2008/02/21/moral-thinking
David Sloan Wilson, of Binghamton University, in New York state, agrees with that point, but reckons the actual moral sense an individual acquires is not arbitrary, as a language is, but is functionally adapted to circumstances.
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Dr Wilson suspects that the liberal package of individualism and confrontation is the appropriate response to survival in a stable environment in which there is leisure for learning and reflection, and the consequences for a group’s stability of such dissent are low. The conservative package of collectivism and conformity, by contrast, works in an unstable environment where joint action, and thus obedience to their group, are at a premium. It is an interesting suggestion, and it is one that plays into the question of how morality actually evolved.
That was addressed by Samuel Bowles, of the Santa Fe Institute in New Mexico. An important feature of moral behaviour is altruism. Normally, biologists explain this as being either nepotism or you-scratch-my-back-and-I’ll-scratch-yours. But Dr Bowles believes people do perform acts which cost them more than they gain. To explain this, he invokes an idea that went out of fashion in the 1960s: group selection. This says that the winnowing of the gene pool, which drives evolution, can favour or destroy entire social groups as single entities, as well as working at the level of individual organisms.
No one ever claimed group selection is impossible, but it looks mathematically unlikely. Dr Bowles, however, thinks that the virtues of human collaboration are so great that groups composed of genuine, self-sacrificing altruists would outcompete others.
His best example of such self-sacrifice is warfare, an activity in which morality and immorality intersect in ways that have always been puzzling—and where liberals and conservatives often draw opposite conclusions about what is right and wrong. Paradoxically, that clash of views suggests that Dr Bowles and Dr Wilson really are on to something with the idea of functional morality. Perhaps they and their colleagues can eventually do what philosophers have never managed, and explain moral behaviour in an intellectually satisfying way.