Discussion of The History of Sexuality – Michel Foucault

October 5, 2025

published in 1976, translated in 1977 – full PDF attached below –

“Sexuality,” Foucault suggests, is by no means a fixed term that identifies an objective concept in the world. Rather, it evolved in the nineteenth century as a result of the peculiar marriage of scientific discourse and confession. Before the nineteenth century, there was no such thing as “sexuality,” as such.

Lecture by Christina Hendricks

Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v0tfJl1NKDk&t=1260s

what is sexuality? @ 25mins
begins analysis of text – after break @ 53 mins “most important point to get”
overall conclusion of book: @ 1.04 NOTQUOTE: “Trying to liberate ourselves from repression, as if we have we have some kind of true, natural sexual identity is problematic” Sexuality is constructed.
@1.06 multiple discourses about sex
“Sexuality,” Foucault suggests, is by no means a fixed term that identifies an objective concept in the world. Rather, it evolved in the nineteenth century as a result of the peculiar marriage of scientific discourse and confession. Before the nineteenth century, there was no such thing as “sexuality,” as such.
Our concept of sexuality as fundamental to human nature has more to do with the contingent evolution of our discourses than with the actual facts of the matter. As such, Foucault is one of the first constructivists regarding sexuality. That is, he regards sexual categories as contingent human constructions. On the opposite side of this debate are the essentialists, who argue that our sexual categories are fixed, that we are actually drawing on objective, scientific facts when we make distinctions. 
Sexual repression was not exercised on the working class for economic motives, nor was it a form of asceticism. It was a self-affirmation of the ruling, bourgeois class. The bourgeois became interested in controlling sex as a means of preserving their own health and lineage. The bourgeois did not try to get rid of sex, but rather saw it as all-important.
According to Foucault, sexuality is a means of focusing, channeling, and transmitting power, and power is a creative force that determines the relationships between people, institutions, and concepts. The bourgeois of the nineteenth century, who effectively invented what we think of as “sexuality,” used this invention as a means of bolstering and extending their power. They came to see their sexuality as largely determining who they were physically, mentally, and spiritually. Controlling this sexuality became a means of controlling their destiny.
Foucault characterizes the transition between the right of death and power over life as a transition from a “symbolics of blood” to an “analytics of sex.” Previously, blood was taken as a symbol of power. Blood lines and purity of blood were all important, the right of death was exercised by spilling blood, and so on. Now, power is exercised through sex. This interest in sexuality has rendered possible unprecedented knowledge, power, and control over a population. This transition was far from smooth, and Foucault identifies a symbolics of blood lingering in the racism of the Nazis and their demands for racial “purity.” In psychoanalysis, sexuality is also read as being born out of earlier laws based on blood ties.
We have become so caught up in the deployment of sexuality that we see the very possibility of our “liberation” as hinging on a healthy sexuality. The irony is that this belief that sex holds the key to our liberation is a manifestation of the power that is being exercised on us. If we want to resist this power, we should not focus on sexuality but on the body and the physical pleasures that sexuality tries to appropriate.
These examples show the extent to which we have come to understand the world around us in terms of sex. This is so because sex has been such a convenient point from which power could be exercised. Foucault shows how the deployment of sexuality always serves the political interests of the discipline of the body and the regulation of population.
It occurred to Foucault that the moral and social ‘truths’ invoked in order to label him ‘deviant’ were mere fictions. There was no need to feel guilt over madness, homosexuality or suicidal tendencies. For the rest of his life, he would devote himself to showing how grand slogans and scientific terms were simply tools for legitimising relationships of power and domination.
Foucault’s protests meshed perfectly with the assumptions of a generation shaped by the counter-culture of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Conscious of Vietnam and Watergate, students were highly receptive to conspiracy theories featuring the oppressive power of the Establishment, and Foucault’s ideas provided intellectual tools for radical new liberation movements. Most obviously, they were attractive to the burgeoning gay subculture. The universal norm of ‘Nature’ had been used in both Christian and Enlightenment discourse to brand the homosexual unnatural and perverse. Foucault claimed to unmask the universal norm as nothing more than a tool of oppression being wielded by the powerful. 
If Nietzsche’s iconoclastic attack on universal norms has given birth to postmodernist scepticism, its corollary – that one has to create one’s own norms – is becoming almost equally influential. Since individuals have no obligation to conform to a pattern set in heaven, they are free to fashion themselves in whatever way they choose. One’s nature and one’s values are not given; they are invented. ‘Let us,’ Nietzsche urged his readers, ‘be involved in the creation of our own new tables of values … we want to be those who give themselves their own law, those who create themselves!’ ‘One thing is needed,’ he declared, ‘to give style to one’s character – a great and rare art.’ And the way to do this, he insisted, was by unlocking the ‘Dionysian’ element in one’s personality – the wild, untamed, animal energy within, one’s own personal daimon. ‘Man needs what is most evil in him for what is best in him.’ Only by exercising ‘the will to power’ could one discover transcendence.
Like Nietzsche, Foucault believed that the tools for such self-fashioning were to be found in what he called ‘limit experience’ – experience of extremes which could release powerful creative forces and produce intense joy. His fascination with madness, death, violence, perversion and suicide was nourished by a conviction that these were not things to be ignored, cured or locked away, but creative phenomena to be released. His books were not simply negative critiques of oppression; they included an implicit challenge to liberate oneself by transgressing boundaries
The philosopher Alan Soble wrote in the Journal of Sex Research …  credited Foucault with inspiring “genealogical” studies “informed by the heuristic idea that not only are patterns of sexual desire and behavior socially engineered … but also that the concepts of our sexual discourse are equally socially constructed” and with influencing “gender studies, feminism, Queer Theory,
He credited Simone de Beauvoir with anticipating Foucault’s view that patterns of sexual desire and behavior are socially determined.[18] 
feminist Germaine Greer wrote that Foucault rightly argues that, “what we have all along taken as the breaking-through of a silence and the long delayed giving of due attention to human sexuality was in fact the promotion of human sexuality, indeed, the creation of an internal focus for the individual’s preoccupations.”[21] 
 philosopher José Guilherme Merquior  suggested in Foucault (1985) that Foucault’s views about sexual repression are preferable to those of Reich, Herbert Marcuse, and their followers in that they have provide more accurate descriptions and that Foucault is supported by “the latest historiographic research on bourgeois sex”.
The philosopher Roger Scruton rejected Foucault’s claim that sexual morality is culturally relative in Sexual Desire (1986). He also criticized Foucault for assuming that there could be societies in which a “problematisation” of the sexual did not occur. Scruton concluded that, “No history of thought could show the ‘problematisation’ of sexual experience to be peculiar to certain specific social formations: it is characteristic of personal experience generally, and therefore of every genuine social order.”[24] 
The critic Camille Paglia rejected Halperin’s views, calling The History of Sexuality a “disaster”. Paglia wrote that much of The History of Sexuality is fantasy unsupported by the historical record, and that it “is acknowledged even by Foucault’s admirers to be his weakest work”.[31] 
historian Roy Porter  credited Foucault with discrediting the view, proposed for example by Marcuse in Eros and Civilization (1955), that “industrialization demanded erotic austerity.”[37] 
 psychoanalyst Joel Whitebook  found Foucault’s views to be comparable to those of Marcuse and suggested that Foucault was indebted to Marcuse.[41] 

Everyone knew, for example, that children had no sex, which was why they were forbidden to talk about it, why one closed one’s eyes and stopped one’s ears whenever they came to show evidence to the contrary, and why a general and studied silence was imposed. These are the characteristic features attributed to repression, which serve to distinguish it from the prohibitions maintained by penal law: repression operated as a sentence to disappear, but also as an injunction to silence, an affirmation of nonexistence, and, by implication, an admission that there was nothing to say about such things, nothing to see, and nothing to know. Such was the hypocrisy of our bourgeois societies with its halting logic.  It was forced to make a few concessions, however. If it was truly necessary to make room for illegitimate sexualities, it was reasoned, let them take their infernal mischief elsewhere: to a place where they could be reintegrated, if not in the circuits of production, at least in those of profit. The brothel and the mental hospital would be those places of tolerance: the prostitute, the client, and the pimp, together with the psychiatrist and his hysteric – those “other Victorians,” as Steven Marcus would say-seem to have surreptitiously transferred the pleasures that are unspoken into the order of things that are counted. Words and gestures, quietly authorized, could be exchanged there at the going rate. Only in those places would untrammeled sex have a right to (safely insularized) forms of reality, and only to clandestine, circumscribed, and coded types of discourse. Everywhere else, modern puritanism imposed its triple edict of taboo, nonexistence, and silence.
NOT QUOTE feminist Kate Millett wrote her dissertation under Steven Marcus’s guidance, and when it was published as Sexual Politics shortly thereafter to wide acclaim, Millett singled out Marcus for gratitude in the preface, citing his “intellectual courage”.[8]  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steven_Marcus
We are informed that if repression has indeed been the fundamental link between power, knowledge, and sexuality since the classical age, it stands to reason that we will not be able to free ourselves from it except at a considerable cost: nothing less than a transgression of laws, a lifting of prohibitions, an irruption of speech, a reinstating of pleasure within reality, and a whole new economy in the mechanisms of power will be required.
Thus, one denounces Freud’s conformism, the normalizing functions of psychoanalysis, the obvious timidity underlying Reich’s vehemence, and all the effects of integration ensured by the “science” of sex and the barely equivocal practices of sexology.
By placing the advent of the age of repression in the seventeenth century, after hundreds of years of open spaces and free expression, one adjusts it to coincide with the development of capitalism: it becomes an integral part of the bourgeois order
At a time when labor capacity was being systematically exploited, how could this capacity be allowed to dissipate itself in pleasurable pursuits, except in those-reduced to a minimum-that enabled it to reproduce itself?
If sex is repressed, that is, condemned to prohibition, nonexistence, and silence, then the mere fact that one is speaking about it has the appearance of a deliberate transgression. A person who holds forth in such language places himself to a certain extent outside the reach of power; he upsets established law; he somehow anticipates the coming freedom.
page 7
Ours is, after all, the only civilization in which officials are paid to listen to all and sundry impart the secrets of their sex: as if the urge to talk about it, and the interest one hopes to arouse by doing so, have far surpassed the possibilities of being heard, so that some individuals have even offered their ears for hire.
Briefly, my aim is to examine the case of a society which has been loudly castigating itself for its hypocrisy for more than a century, which speaks verbosely of its own silence, takes great pains to relate in detail the things it does not say, denounces the powers it exercises, and promises to liberate itself from the very laws that have made it function. I would like to explore not only these discourses but also the will that sustains them and the strategic intention that supports them. The question I would like to pose is not, Why are we repressed? but rather, Why do we say, with so much passion and so much resentment against our most recent past, against our present, and against ourselves, that we are repressed? By what spiral did we come to affirm that sex is negated? What led us to show, ostentatiously, that sex is something we hide, to say it is something we silence?
  1. First doubt: Is sexual repression truly an established historical fact?
  2. Second doubt: Do the workings of power, and in particular those mechanisms that are brought into play in societies such as ours, really belong primarily to the category of repression?
  3. A third and final doubt: Did the critical discourse that addresses itself to repression come to act as a roadblock to a power mechanism that had operated unchallenged up to that point, or is it not in fact part of the same historical network as the thing it denounces (and doubtless misrepresents) by calling it “repression”? 
The sex of children and adolescents has become, since the eighteenth century, an important area of contention around which innumerable institutional devices and discursive strategies have been deployed.
One could mention many other centers which in the eighteenth or nineteenth century began to produce discourses on sex. First there was medicine, via the “nervous disorders”; next psychiatry, when it set out to discover the etiology of 6 6 mental illnesses, focusing its gaze first on excess,” then onanism, then frustration, then “frauds against procreation,” but especially when it annexed the whole of the sexual perversions as its own province; criminal justice, too, which had long been concerned with sexuality, particularly in the form of “heinous” crimes and crimes against nature, but which, toward the middle of the nineteenth century, broadened its jurisdiction to include petty offenses, minor indecencies, insignificant perversions; and lastly, all those social controls, cropping up at the end of the last century, which screened the sexuality of couples, parents and children, dangerous and endangered adolescents-undertaking to protect, The Repressive Hypothesis 31 separate, and forewarn, signaling perils everywhere, awakening people’s attention, calling for diagnoses, piling up reports, organizing therapies. These sites radiated discourses aimed at sex, intensifying people’s awareness of it as a constant danger, and this in turn created a further incentive to talk about it.
Rather than the uniform concern to hide sex, rather than a general prudishness of language, what distinguishes these last three centuries is the variety, the wide dispersion of devices that were invented for speaking about it, for having it be spoken about, for inducing it to speak of itself, for listening, recording, transcribing, and redistributing what is said about it: around sex, a whole network of varying, specific, and coercive transpositions into discourse. Rather than a massive censorship, beginning with the verbal proprieties imposed by the Age of Reason, what was involved was a regulated and polymorphous incitement to discourse.
2  The Perverse Implantation page 36
Through the various discourses, legal sanctions against minor perversions were multiplied; sexual irregularity was annexed to mental illness; from childhood to old age, a norm of sexual development was defined and all the possible deviations were carefully described; pedagogical controls and medical treatments were organized; around the least fantasies, moralists, but especially doctors, brandished the whole emphatic vocabulary of abomination.
Were these anything more than means employed to absorb, for the benefit of a genitally centered sexuality, all the fruitless pleasures? All this garrulous attention which has us in a stew over sexuality, is it not motivated by one basic concern: to ensure population, to reproduce labor capacity, to perpetuate the form of social relations: in short, to constitute a sexuality that is economically useful and politically conservative? 
I still do not know whether this is the ultimate objective.
page 45
The medical examination, the psychiatric investigation, the pedagogical report, and family controls may Gave the over-all and apparent objective of saying no to all wayward or unproductive sexualities, but the fact is that they function as mechanisms with a double impetus: pleasure and power. The pleasure that comes of exercising a power that questions, monitors, watches, spies, searches out, palpates, brings to light; and on the other hand, the pleasure that kindles at having to evade this power, flee from it, fool it, or travesty it.
These attractions, these evasions, these circular incitements have traced around bodies and sexes, not boundaries not to be crossed, but perpetual spirals of power and pleasure.
PART THREE Scientia Sexualis page 50
page 57
Historically, there have been two great procedures for producing the truth of sex. On the one hand, the societies-and they are numerous: China, Japan, India, Rome, the Arabo-Moslem societies which endowed themselves with an ars erotica. In the erotic art, truth is drawn from pleasure itself, understood as a practice and accumulated as experience;
Consequently, the relationship to the master who holds the secrets is of paramount importance; only he, working alone, can transmit this art in an esoteric manner and as the culmination of an initiation in which he guides the disciple’s progress with unfailing skill and severity.
[Ours]  is undoubtedly the only civilization to practice a scientia sexualis; or rather, the only civilization to have developed over the centuries procedures for telling the truth of sex which are geared to a form of knowledge-power strictly opposed to the art of initiations and the masterful secret: I have in mind the confession.
Since the Middle Ages at least, Western societies have established the confession as one of the main rituals we rely on for the production of truth: the codification of the sacrament of penance by the Lateran Council in 1215,
Since the Middle Ages, torture has accompanied it like a shadow, and supported it when it could go no further: the dark twins.
The confession was, and still remains, the general standard governing the production of the true discourse on sex. It has undergone a considerable transformation, however. For a long time, it remained firmly entrenched in the practice of penance. But with the rise of Protestantism, the Counter Reformation, eighteenth-century pedagogy, and nineteenth century medicine, it gradually lost its ritualistic and exclusive localization; it spread; it has been employed in a whole series of relationships: children and parents, students and educators, patients and psychiatrists, delinquents and experts. The motivations and effects it is expected to produce have varied, as have the forms it has taken: interrogations, consultations, autobiographical narratives, letters; they have been recorded, transcribed, assembled into dossiers, published, and commented on.
This was an important time. It is easy to make light of these nineteenth-century psychiatrists, who made a point of apologizing-for the horrors they were about to let speak, evoking “immoral behavior” or “aberrations of the genetic senses,” but I am more inclined to applaud their seriousness: they had a feeling for momentous events.
Those who believe that sex was more rigorously elided in the nineteenth century than ever before, through a formidable mechanism of blockage and a deficiency of discourse, can say what they please. There was no deficiency, but rather an excess, a redoubling, too much rather than not enough discourse, in any case an interference between two modes of production of truth: procedures of confession, and scientific discursivity.
page 63
It is no longer a question simply of saying what was done-the sexual act-and how it was done; but of reconstructing, in and around the act, the thoughts that recapitulated it, the obsessions that accompanied it, the images, desires, modulations, and quality of the pleasure that animated it. For the first time no doubt, a society has taken upon itself to solicit and hear the imparting of individual pleasures.
a great archive of the pleasures of sex was gradually constituted. For a long time this archive dematerialized as it was formed. It regularly disappeared without a trace (thus suiting the purposes of the Christian pastoral) until medicine, psychiatry, and pedagogy began to solidify it: Campe, Salzmann, and especially Kaan, Krafft-Ebing, Tardieu, Molle, and Havelock Ellis carefully assembled this whole pitiful, lyrical outpouring from the sexual mosaic.
page 65 – 67
how did this immense and traditional extortion of the sexual confession come to be constituted in scientific terms? 
[he’s talking about Freud according to Hendricks]
1. Through a clinical codification of the inducement to speak. Combining confession with examination, the personal . history with the deployment of a set of decipherable signs and symptoms; the interrogation, the exacting questionnaire, and hypnosis, with the recollection of memories and free association: all were ways of reinscribing the procedure of confession in a field of scientifically acceptable observations. 
 2. Through the postulate of a general and diffuse causality…. This may well appear fantastic to us, but the principle of sex as a “cause of any and everything” was the theoretical underside of a confession that had to be thorough, meticulous, and constant, The History of Sexuality and at the same time operate within a scientific type of practice. The limitless dangers that sex carried with it justified the exhaustive character of the inquisition to which it was subjected.
3. Through the principle of a latency intrinsic to sexuality…. By integrating it into the beginnings of a scientific discourse, the nineteenth century altered the scope of the confession; it tended no longer to be concerned solely with what the subject wished to hide, but with what was hidden from himself, being incapable of coming to light except gradually and through the labor of a confession in which the questioner and the questioned each had a part to play….
4. Through the method of interpretation.  The truth did not reside solely in the subject who, by confessing, would reveal it wholly formed. It was constituted in two stages: present but incomplete, blind to itself, in the one who spoke, it could only reach completion in the one who assimilated and recorded it. It was the latter’s function to verify this obscure truth: the revelation of confession had to be coupled with the decipherment of what it said.
5. Through the medicalization of the effects of confession. The obtaining of the confession and its effects were recodified as therapeutic operations.
page 68
In any case, nearly one hundred and fifty years have gone into the making of a complex machinery for producing true discourses on sex: a deployment that spans a wide segment of history in that it connects the ancient injunction of confession to clinical listening methods. It is this deployment that enables something called “sexuality” to embody the truth of sex and its pleasures.
Situated at the point of intersection of a technique of confession and a scientific discursivity, where certain major mechanisms had to be found for adapting them to one another (the listening technique, the postulate of causality, the principle of latency, the rule of interpretation, the imperative of medicalization), sexuality was defined as being “by nature”: a domain susceptible to pathological processes, and hence one calling for therapeutic or normalizing interventions; a field of meanings to decipher; the site of processes concealed by specific mechanisms; a focus of indefinite causal relations; and an obscure speech (parole) that had to be ferreted out and listened to.
page 71
We have at least invented a different kind of pleasure: pleasure in the truth of pleasure, the pleasure of knowing that truth, of discovering and exposing it, the fascination of seeing it and telling it, of captivating and capturing others by it, of confiding it in secret, of luring it out in the open – the specific pleasure of the true discourse on pleasure.
page 103
we can distinguish four great strategic unities which, beginning in the eighteenth century, formed specific mechanisms of knowledge and power centering on sex.
1. A hysterization of women’s bodies:
2. A pedagogization of children’s sex:
3. A socialization of procreative behavior:
4. A psychiatrization of perverse pleasure:
page 105
Four figures emerged from this preoccupation with sex, which mounted throughout the nineteenth century – four privileged objects of knowledge, which were also targets and anchorage points for the ventures of knowledge: the hysterical woman, the masturbating child, the Malthusian couple, and the perverse adult.
page 131
Thus between the two world wars there formed, around Reich, the historico political critique of sexual repression. The importance of this critique and its impact on reality were substantial. But the very possibility of its success was tied to the fact that it always unfolded within the deployment of sexuality, and not outside or against it. The fact that so many things were able to change in the sexual behavior of Western societies without any of the promises or political conditions predicted by Reich being realized is sufficient proof that this whole sexual “revolution,” this whole “antirepressive” struggle, represented nothing more, but nothing less-and its importance is undeniable-than a tactical shift and reversal in the great deployment of sexuality.
page 145
This is the background that enables us to understand the importance assumed by sex as a political issue. It was at the pivot of the two axes along which developed the entire political technology of life. On the one hand it was tied to the disciplines of the body: the harnessing, intensification, and distribution of forces, the adjustment and economy of energies. On the other hand, it was applied to the regulation of populations, through all the far-reaching effects of its activity.
page 146
Sex was a means of access both to the life of the body and the life of the species. It was employed as a standard for the disciplines and as a basis for regulations. This is why in the nineteenth century sexuality was sought out in the smallest details of individual existences; it was tracked down in behavior, pursued in dreams; it was suspected of underlying the least follies, it was traced back into the earliest years of childhood; it became the stamp of individuality-at the same time what enabled one to analyze the latter and what made it possible to master it. But one also sees it becoming the theme of political operations, economic interventions (through incitements to or curbs on procreation), and ideological campaigns for raising standards of morality and responsibility: it was put forward as the index of a society’s strength, revealing of both its political energy and its biological vigor.
page 146
Whence the importance of the four great lines of attack along which the politics of sex advanced for two centuries. Each one was a way of combining disciplinary techniques with regulative methods. The first two rested on the requirements of regulation, on a whole thematic of the species, descent, and collective welfare, in order to obtain results at the level of discipline; the sexualization of children was accomplished in the form of a campaign for the health of the race (precocious sexuality was presented from the eighteenth century to the end of the nineteenth as an epidemic menace that risked compromising not only the future health of adults but the future of the entire society and species); the hysterization of women, which involved a thorough medicalization of their bodies and their sex, was carried out in the name of the Right of Death and Power over Life responsibility they owed to the health of their children, the solidity of the family institution, and the safeguarding of society. It was the reverse relationship that applied in the case of birth controls and the psychiatrization of perversions: here the intervention was regulatory in nature, but it had to rely on the demand for individual disciplines and constraints (dressages). Broadly speaking, at the juncture of the “body” and the “population,” sex became a crucial target of a power organized around the management of life rather than the menace of death.
page 147
The blood relation long remained an important element in the mechanisms of power, its manifestations, and its rituals. For a society in which the systems of alliance, the political form of the sovereign, the differentiation into orders and castes, and the value of descent lines were predominant; for a society in which famine, epidemics, and violence made death imminent, blood constituted one of the fundamental values. It owed its high value at the same time to its instrumental role (the ability to shed blood), to the way it functioned in the order of signs (to have a certain blood, to be of the same blood, to be prepared to risk one’s blood), and also to its precariousness (easily spilled, subject to drying up, too readily mixed, capable of being quickly corrupted). A society of blood-I was tempted to say, of “sanguinity”-where power spoke through blood: the honor of war, the fear of famine, the triumph of death, the sovereign with his sword, executioners, and tortures; blood was a reality with a symbolic function. We, on the other hand, are in a society of “sex,” or rather a society “with a sexuality”: the mechanisms of power are addressed to the body, to life, to what causes it to proliferate, to what reinforces the species, its stamina, its ability to dominate, or its capacity for being used. Through the themes of health, progeny, race, the future of the species, the vitality of the social body, power spoke of sexuality and to sexuality; the latter was not a mark or a symbol, it was an object and a target. Moreover, its importance was due less to its rarity or its precariousness than to its insistence, its insidious presence, the fact that it was everywhere an object of excitement and fear at the same time. Power delineated it, aroused it, and employed it as the proliferating meaning that had always to be taken control of again lest it escape; it was an effect with a meaning-value. I do not mean to say that a substitution of sex for blood was by itself responsible for all the transformations that marked the threshold of our modernity. It is not the soul of two civilizations or the organizing principle of two cultural forms that I am attempting to express; I am looking for the reasons for which sexuality, far from being repressed in the society of that period, on the contrary was constantly aroused. The new procedures of power that were devised during the classical age and employed in the nineteenth century were what caused our societies to go from a symbolics of blood to an analytics of sexuality.
page 148
Sade and the first eugenists were contemporary with this transition from “sanguinity” to “sexuality.” [what does this mean???]
page 153
In the sexualization of childhood, there was formed the idea of a sex that was both present (from the evidence of anatomy) and absent (from the standpoint of physiology), present too if one considered its activity, and deficient if one referred to its reproductive finality; or again, actual in its manifestations, but hidden in its eventual effects, whose pathological seriousness would only become apparent later. If the sex of the child was still present in the adult, it was in the form of a secret causality that tended to nullify the sex of the latter (it was one of the tenets of eighteenth- and nineteenthcentury medicine that precocious sex would eventually result in sterility, impotence, frigidity, the inability to experience pleasure, or the deadening of the senses); by sexualizing childhood, the idea was established of a sex characterized essentially by the interplay of presence and absence, the visible and the hidden; masturbation and the effects imputed to it were thought to reveal in a privileged way this interplay of presence and absence, of the visible and the hidden.

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